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  OPINION 
________________                              
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.    
Plaintiffs, a collection of individuals and entities 
involved with various aspects of the adult media industry, 
brought this action challenging the constitutionality of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2257 and 2257A (the “Statutes”), which are 
criminal laws imposing recordkeeping, labeling, and 
inspection requirements on producers of sexually explicit 
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depictions.1
The government moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and with respect to Plaintiffs’ Fourth 
  Plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality of 
certain regulations promulgated pursuant to the Statutes.  
Plaintiffs claim that the Statutes and regulations violate, inter 
alia, various provisions of the First, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution—as applied and 
facially—and seek declaratory and injunctive relief.     
                                                          
1 Plaintiff-appellants include: Free Speech Coalition, Inc. 
(“FSC”), a trade association representing more than 1,000 
member businesses and individuals involved in the 
production and distribution of adult materials; American 
Society of Media Photographers, Inc., a trade association for 
photographers; Townsend Enterprises, Inc., a producer and 
distributor of adult materials created for the purpose of 
educating adults about sexual health and fulfillment; David 
Conners, a.k.a. Dave Cummings, a producer of—and 
performer in—adult movies; Carol Queen, a sociologist, 
sexologist, and feminist sex educator; Marie L. Levine, a.k.a 
Nina Hartley, an actress appearing in more than 650 adult 
films; Betty Dodson, a sexologist, sex educator, author, and 
artist; Carlin Ross, who hosts a website with Dodson 
providing individuals ashamed of their genitalia with a forum 
for anonymously discussing and posting images of their 
genitalia; Michael Barone, a photographer who creates erotic 
portraits; Thomas Hymes, a journalist who operates a website 
related to the adult industry; Barbara Alper, a commercial 
photographer; Barbara Nitke, a faculty member for the School 
of Visual Arts in New York City and a photographer; David 
Steinberg, a photographer; and Dave Levingston, a 
photographer (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).   
 Plaintiff C1R Distribution, LLC did not appeal the 
District Court’s order. 
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Amendment claim, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on 
ripeness and standing grounds under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).  
The government also asserted that two of the Plaintiffs—FSC 
and Conners—were barred by issue preclusion from asserting 
that § 2257 violates the First Amendment.  Plaintiffs opposed 
the government’s motion and moved for leave to amend their 
Fourth Amendment claim. 
The District Court granted the government’s motion, 
dismissed the complaint in its entirety, and denied Plaintiffs’ 
motion for leave to amend their complaint.  Plaintiffs 
appealed.  We will vacate the District Court’s order to the 
extent that it: dismissed in their entirety Plaintiffs’ claims 
brought pursuant to the First Amendment (Count 1) and the 
Fourth Amendment (Count 4); dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for 
injunctive relief (Count 6) to the extent that it asserts a right 
to injunctive relief for violations of the First Amendment or 
the Fourth Amendment; and denied Plaintiffs leave to amend 
their Fourth Amendment claim.  We will affirm the District 
Court’s order in all other respects and remand the case for 
further proceedings.     
I. BACKGROUND 
A. BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY LEGISLATION  
In 1978, Congress enacted the Protection of Children 
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 (“1977 Act”), Pub. 
L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252, and 2256), which criminalized the 
commercial use of children in sexually explicit materials.  
After the 1977 Act went into effect, much of the child 
pornography industry went underground and became 
noncommercial.  See Attorney General’s Commission on 
Pornography, Final Report, 408-09, 604-05 (1986) (the 
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“Report”).  In response, Congress enacted the Child 
Protection Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”), Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 
Stat. 204 (codified as amended in various sections of 18 
U.S.C., including §§ 2251-2254).  The 1984 Act, inter alia, 
increased certain monetary penalties for distributing 
depictions of children engaged in sexual activity and 
broadened the protections of the 1977 Act to declare unlawful 
the production of noncommercial child pornography.  Pub. L. 
No. 98-292 §§ 3 and 5 (no longer requiring that the 
production be for “pecuniary profit”).     
In 1986, the Attorney General’s Commission on 
Pornography issued its final Report, which found that 
although the 1977 and 1984 Acts “drastically curtailed [child 
pornography’s] public presence,” they did not end the 
problem and that “no evidence . . . suggest[ed] that children 
[were] any less at risk than before.”  See Report at 608-09.  
The Report further found that producers of sexually explicit 
matter generally sought youthful-looking performers, which 
“has made it increasingly difficult for law enforcement 
officers to ascertain whether an individual in a film or other 
visual depiction is a minor.”  Id. at 618.  The Report 
recommended that Congress “enact a statute requiring the 
producers, retailers or distributors of sexually explicit visual 
depictions to maintain records containing . . . proof of 
performers’ ages.”  Id. at 618.  The Report also recommended 
that the location of this information be identified “in the 
opening or closing footage of a film, the inside cover of the 
magazine, or standard locations in or on other material 
containing visual depictions,” and that the information be 
“available for inspection by any duly authorized law 
enforcement officer upon demand as a regulatory function for 
the limited purposes of determining consent and proof of 
age.”  Id. at 620-21.    
B. SECTION 2257  
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 In 1988, Congress enacted the Child Protection and 
Obscenity Enforcement Act, including § 2257, which adopted 
recordkeeping provisions similar to those recommended by 
the Report.  See Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7513, 102 Stat. 4485, 
4487-88 (1988) (“1988 Act”).   
Section 2257, as amended, imposes three basic 
requirements on producers of adult media.  First, any person 
who produces visual depictions of “actual sexually explicit 
conduct” must “create and maintain individually identifiable 
records pertaining to every performer portrayed.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2257(a).  The term “actual sexually explicit conduct” is 
defined to mean actual but not simulated: sexual intercourse, 
bestiality, masturbation, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or 
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any 
person.  Id. at (h)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A).  To ensure the 
reliability of these records, a producer subject to § 2257 must 
review each performer’s photo identification and ascertain, 
inter alia, the performer’s name and date of birth.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2257(b)(1).  The producer must also ascertain any other 
name used by the performer in previous depictions.  Id. at 
(b)(2).    Second, a producer subject to § 2257 must “affix[] to 
every copy of any [visual depiction covered by § 2257] . . . a 
statement describing where the records required by [§ 2257] 
with respect to all performers depicted in that copy of the 
matter may be located.”  Id. at (e)(1).  Third, producers must 
maintain copies of their performers’ identification documents 
at their “business premises, or at such other place[s] as the 
Attorney General may by regulation prescribe and shall make 
such records available to the Attorney General for inspection 
at all reasonable times.”  Id. at (b)(3) and (c).           
Producers subject to § 2257 may be exposed to 
criminal liability if they: “fail to create or maintain the 
records as required”; “knowingly . . . make any false entry in 
or knowingly . . . fail to make an appropriate entry in, any 
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[required] record”; “knowingly . . . fail to comply with the 
[labeling provisions of § 2257(e)]”; “knowingly sell or 
otherwise transfer, or offer for sale or transfer” any visual 
depiction subject to § 2257 that does not contain the label 
required by § 2257(e); or “refuse to permit the Attorney 
General or his or her designee for an inspection.”  18 U.S.C.  
§ 2257(f)(1)-(5).  First time violators of § 2257 may be 
imprisoned for not more than five years.  Id. at (i). 
C. SECTION 2257A  
Congress next promulgated the Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (“2006 Act”), Pub. L. No. 
109-248, § 503, 120 Stat. 587, including § 2257A.  In 
enacting the 2006 Act, Congress made numerous findings, 
including that a substantial interstate market in child 
pornography continued to exist and that many of the 
individuals in this market distributed child pornography with 
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the expectation of receiving the same in return.  Id.  
§ 501(1)(B).2
Section 2257A regulates recordkeeping requirements 
for visual depictions of simulated sexually explicit conduct—
as opposed to § 2257, which regulates actual sexually explicit 
conduct.  The regulations implementing § 2257A defined 
simulated sexually explicit conduct to mean 
    
conduct engaged in by performers that is 
depicted in a manner that would cause a 
reasonable viewer to believe that the performers 
engaged in actual sexually explicit conduct, 
even if they did not in fact do so.  It does not 
mean . . . sexually explicit conduct that is 
merely suggested.      
28 C.F.R. § 75.1(o).  Section 2257A imposes the same 
recordkeeping, labeling, and inspection requirements on 
producers of these depictions as those required by § 2257.  
                                                          
2 Statements by members of both the United States House of 
Representatives and Senate demonstrated the importance they 
attached to § 2257A in further combating child sexual 
exploitation.  Representative Michael Pence, who introduced 
language similar to that of § 2257A’s recordkeeping and 
labeling requirements in a previous bill, stated that his intent 
in drafting that bill was to “prevent American children from 
becoming victims of pornography,” such as being “forced to 
pose for pornographic pictures or act in pornographic videos.”  
152 Cong. Rec. H5705-01, H5724 (July 25, 2006).  Similarly, 
Senator Mitchell McConnell stated that § 2257A “strengthens 
the pornography recordkeeping and labeling requirements” of 
the 1988 Act and “protect[s] children from exploitation by 
pornographers.” 152 Cong. Rec. S8012-02, S8024 (July 20, 
2006).  
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First-time violators of § 2257A may be imprisoned for not 
more than one year where no minor child is involved or not 
more than five years where a minor is involved.  18 U.S.C.  
§ 2257A(i). 
 Section 2257A(h) provides an exemption for certain 
commercial producers.  Under this provision, producers may 
be exempted from § 2257A in its entirety and with respect to 
certain conduct regulated by § 2257.  Under § 2257A(h), the 
provisions of §§ 2257A and  2257 “shall not apply to matter, 
or any image therein . . . of simulated sexually explicit 
conduct, or actual sexually explicit conduct [involving the 
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any 
person]” (the “Exempted Depictions”) under either of two 
circumstances.  The first circumstance is where the Exempted 
Depictions were: (1) “intended for commercial distribution”; 
(2) “created as part of a commercial enterprise by a person 
who certifies to the Attorney General that such person 
regularly and in the normal course of business collects and 
maintains individually identifiable information regarding all 
performers,” such as the names, addresses, and dates of birth 
of the performers (the “Certification”); and (3) does not 
contain a depiction that an ordinary person would conclude 
was child pornography as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).  18 
U.S.C. § 2257A(h).  The second circumstance is where the 
Exempted Depictions were: (1) subject to the authority and 
regulation of the Federal Communications Commission 
acting in its capacity to regulate the broadcast of obscene, 
indecent, or profane programming; and (2) created as part of a 
commercial enterprise and the Certification was made to the 
Attorney General.  Id.   
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D. REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING §§ 2257 AND 
2257A  
The Department of Justice promulgated regulations 
implementing the Statutes.  These regulations define a 
producer as “any individual, corporation, or other 
organization who is a primary producer or a secondary 
producer.”  28 C.F.R. § 75.1(c).  A primary producer is an 
individual or entity that “actually films, videotapes, 
photographs, or creates a digitally- or computer-manipulated 
image, a digital image, or a picture of . . . a visual depiction of 
an actual human being engaged in actual or simulated 
sexually explicit conduct.”  Id. at (c)(1).  A secondary 
producer is any individual or entity who “produces, 
assembles, manufactures, publishes, duplicates, reproduces, 
or reissues” a visual depiction of an actual human being 
engaged in actual or simulated sexually explicit conduct that 
is intended for commercial distribution.  Id. at (c)(2).  
Producers do not include: photo or film processors, 
distributors, or providers of telecommunications services.  Id. 
at (c)(4). 
 The regulations require primary and secondary 
producers to create and maintain copies of records reflecting 
the performers’ legal names, dates of birth, stage names, and 
the date of the original production.  See, e.g., 28 C.F.R.  
§ 75.2(a).  Secondary producers may satisfy these 
requirements by accepting copies of the records created and 
maintained by primary producers.  See id. at (b).         
Moreover, the regulations standardize record 
maintenance procedures.  The regulations set forth the 
manner in which the records are to be organized and require 
that these records be maintained separate from any other 
business records.  28 C.F.R. § 75.2(a)(3) and (e).  Producers 
may contract with a non-employee custodian of the records, 
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but such a contract does not relieve the producers of their 
liability under the Statutes.  Id. at (h).  Producers may make 
these records available for inspection either at their place of 
business or at the place of business for the non-employee 
custodian of records.  28 C.F.R. § 75.4. 
E. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
On October 7, 2009, Plaintiffs filed both a complaint 
challenging the constitutionality of the Statutes and a motion 
for a preliminary injunction.  The complaint alleges that the 
Statutes are unconstitutional both as applied to Plaintiffs and 
facially pursuant to: the First Amendment (Count 1); the Fifth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause (Count 2); the Fourth 
Amendment (Count 4); and the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination (Count 5).  The complaint further 
alleges that certain regulations promulgated to implement the 
Statutes are unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, in 
particular 28 C.F.R. §§ 75.1(c)(1), 75.2(a)(4), and 75.6(a) 
(Count 3), and that Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary and 
permanent injunctive relief with respect to the Statutes and 
regulations (Count 6).   
On December 14, 2009, the government filed both its 
opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction 
and its motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety 
under Rule 12(b)(6) and dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment claim under Rule 12(b)(1).  On March 12, 2010, 
the District Court held oral argument on the government’s 
motions, and subsequently the parties filed supplemental 
briefs.   
On April 5, 2010, Plaintiffs moved for leave to amend 
their Fourth Amendment claim in response to ripeness 
challenges by the government.  In the proposed amendment, 
Plaintiffs sought to assert additional allegations regarding 
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warrantless searches that took place pursuant to § 2257.  The 
government opposed Plaintiffs’ motion to amend.3
On September 17, 2010, the District Court granted the 
government’s motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs’ motion 
for leave to amend.  The District Court found that plaintiffs 
FSC and Conners were collaterally estopped from challenging 
the constitutionality of § 2257 under the First Amendment 
because they previously challenged § 2257 in a federal action 
in Colorado, where that court granted partial summary 
judgment for the government.
    
4
The District Court also determined that Plaintiffs failed 
to assert a claim under the First Amendment.  As to Plaintiffs’ 
as-applied challenge under the First Amendment, the District 
Court found that the Statutes were content neutral because the 
government’s purpose in enacting the Statutes was to deter 
production and distribution of child pornography, not to 
express disagreement with the production of sexually explicit 
depictions.  The District Court determined that the Statutes 
satisfy intermediate scrutiny because they: advance the 
significant governmental interest of protecting children from 
pornographers; are narrowly tailored because they implement 
uniform age-verification procedures that eliminate producers’ 
subjectivity as to which performers must be age verified; and 
       
                                                          
3 The District Court determined that it should rule on the 
government’s motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs’ motion to 
amend before deciding Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  Consequently, on May 19, 2010, the District 
Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction 
without prejudice.   
 
4 The District Court ruled that FSC and Conners were not 
precluded from challenging the constitutionality of § 2257A 
because this statute was not at issue in the Colorado action. 
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leave open ample adequate alternative channels of 
communication because the Statutes do not ban expression.   
The District Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment facial challenge failed because the Statutes were 
not overbroad.  The court reasoned that Plaintiffs could not 
demonstrate that the claimed overbreadth was either 
substantial or that it posed a real danger as the government 
disavowed the enforcement of the Statutes beyond 
“pornography intended for sale or trade.”   
The District Court further concluded that Plaintiffs’ 
Fourth Amendment claim failed as a matter of law because 
there was no search implicating the Fourth Amendment.  The 
District Court determined that Plaintiffs have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the records subject to inspection, 
and in any event, the inspection program authorized by the 
Statutes constitutes a permissible, warrantless administrative 
search.  The District Court further denied Plaintiffs’ motion to 
amend their Fourth Amendment claim because such an 
amendment was futile.5
Plaintiffs appealed.   
  
                                                          
5 Plaintiffs also asserted a number of other constitutional 
challenges to the Statutes, including that they: violated the 
First Amendment by imposing a prior restraint or precluding 
anonymous speech; unlawfully imposed strict liability for the 
failure to comply with certain recordkeeping provisions; 
violated the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause by 
permitting some producers to be exempt; were 
unconstitutionally vague; and violated the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self incrimination.  The District Court 
analyzed these claims in detail, finding none tenable as a 
matter of law.   
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II. ANALYSIS 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
“Review of a dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is 
plenary.”  Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citing Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 684-85 (3d Cir. 
1997)).  Questions of subject matter jurisdiction raised on a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) are also reviewed de 
novo.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild 
LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010). 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SECTION 
2257 IN OTHER CIRCUITS   
In American Library Association v. Reno and 
Connection Distributing Co. v. Holder, discussed in greater 
detail infra, Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit and Sixth Circuit upheld § 2257 against various 
constitutional challenges.6
(1) American Library Association v. Reno 
 
The plaintiffs in American Library Association 
brought an as-applied First Amendment challenge to § 2257.  
Am. Library Ass’n v. Barr, 794 F. Supp. 412, 413 (D.D.C. 
1992) (“Am. Library”), rev’d sub nom. Am. Library Ass’n v. 
Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Am. Library II”).  
The district court held that § 2257 was unconstitutional 
because it was not narrowly tailored and did not leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication.  Am. Library, 
                                                          
6 The parties have not cited—and we are unaware of—any 
published appellate decisions as to the constitutionality of 
Section 2257A. 
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794 F. Supp. at 417.  The district court reasoned that § 2257 
was not narrowly tailored because it regulates “all depictions 
of actual sexually explicit conduct regardless of the age or 
even the apparent age of the model.”  Id.  As to alternative 
channels for communication, the district court noted that  
§ 2257’s substantial burdens would likely chill speech 
because the penalties for non-compliance are severe, the 
recordkeeping requirements are burdensome, and performers 
can no longer remain anonymous and will face stigmatization 
and ridicule.  Id. at 418-19.          
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed 
in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment.  Am. 
Library II, 33 F.3d at 94.  The court determined that § 2257 
was content neutral because “it is clear that Congress enacted 
the Act not to regulate the content of sexually explicit 
materials, but to protect children by deterring the production 
and distribution of child pornography.”  Id. at 86.   
The D.C. Circuit found that § 2257 satisfied 
intermediate scrutiny.  The court concluded that the 
government had a significant interest in preventing child 
pornography and that the statute, which bans no expression, 
leaves open ample alternative forms of expression.  Id. at 88.  
The court also found that § 2257 was narrowly tailored and 
that it was not overinclusive, rejecting plaintiffs’ argument 
that the statute applies almost entirely to constitutionally 
protected depictions of adults.  Id. at 88-90.  The court noted 
that the “entire point of the Act is to prevent subjective 
determinations of age by implementing a uniform procedure 
that applies to all performers,” and thus, the recordkeeping 
requirements directly furthered the government’s interest.  Id. 
at 90. 
The D.C. Circuit also addressed a number of other 
issues raised by plaintiffs.  The court found that § 2257’s 
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recordkeeping obligations were not onerous and that similar 
requirements are routinely imposed to “facilitate the 
enforcement of our immigration, labor, and tax laws.”  Id. at 
91.  The court further found that plaintiffs were overstating 
the potential chilling effects associated with eliminating 
performers’ anonymity because the statute and regulations 
require only that the investigators have access to these 
records, and thus, performers will not face ridicule and 
stigmatization from the public at large.  Id. at 94. 
The dissent, however, was primarily concerned that  
§ 2257 was unconstitutionally overbroad.  Id. at 94-95 
(Reynolds, J. dissenting).  It noted that the statute regulates 
depictions protected by the First Amendment and “reaches far 
beyond depictions which involve or are likely to involve 
children.”  Id. at 95.  Thus, the dissent concluded that § 2257 
was overbroad, chilled protected speech, and could not 
survive First Amendment scrutiny.  Id.    
The Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ petition for 
certiorari.  Am. Library Ass’n v. Reno, 515 U.S. 1158 (1995).   
(2) Connection Distributing Co. v. Holder 
In Connection Distributing Co. v. Holder, the plaintiff 
(“Connection”), who publishes a “swingers” magazine, 
brought an as-applied and facial First Amendment challenge 
against § 2257.  557 F.3d 321, 326-27 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(“Connection”).7
                                                          
7 “Swinging” is a lifestyle that considers monogamy 
incompatible with human nature, and plaintiffs facilitate 
swinging by providing a venue for likeminded individuals to 
share their sexual interests, preferences, and availability.  
Connection, 557 F.3d at 326. 
  The district court denied Connection’s 
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motion for a preliminary injunction.  Id. at 327.  A Sixth 
Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s denial, stating that 
Connection could not demonstrate a likelihood of success 
because § 2257 was a content-neutral regulation that most 
likely satisfied intermediate scrutiny.  Id.  The panel did not 
address Connection’s facial challenge.  Id.   
On remand, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the government.  Id.  A Sixth Circuit 
panel reversed and remanded.  It directed the district court to 
permit additional discovery and to reconsider the matter in 
light of recent Supreme Court precedent, while noting that 
these intervening decisions by the Supreme Court did not 
affect its prior holding that § 2257 was content neutral.  See 
id.  Connection amended its complaint and added additional 
plaintiffs and claims.  Id.  The district court again denied a 
motion by plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction and granted 
the government’s motion for summary judgment.  Id.  
Plaintiffs appealed.  After an initial reversal of the district 
court, the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en banc.      
The Sixth Circuit sitting en banc, by an 11-6 decision, 
held that § 2257 did not violate the First Amendment either as 
applied to plaintiffs or facially.  Id. at 328-42.8
                                                          
8 The court also held that plaintiffs’ self-incrimination claim 
was not ripe because they had yet to assert a privilege.  
Connection, 557 F.3d at 342-43.  
  In finding § 
2257 constitutional as applied, id. at 328-34, the court noted 
that although § 2257’s recordkeeping requirements depend on 
the content of the images at issue, this did not mean that the 
law was content based.  The court stated that so long as the 
recordkeeping requirements were “‘justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech,’” it could be 
considered content neutral.  Id. at 328 (quoting Ward v. Rock 
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Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (other citations 
omitted).  The court found § 2257 to be a content-neutral 
regulation with only collateral effects on speech because it 
was enacted “not because of its effect on the audience but 
because it is the kind of speech that implicates the 
government’s ban on child pornography.”  Id. at 329.  The 
court then applied intermediate scrutiny, finding that: the 
government had a substantial interest in protecting children 
from exploitation by pornographers; the statute advances this 
interest by ensuring that producers confirm performers’ ages 
and by establishing a compliance system; and plaintiffs had 
ample alternative channels through which they could 
communicate.  Id. at 329-30, 332.  The court also rejected 
plaintiffs’ argument that § 2257’s  age-verification 
requirement was overinclusive because it requires Connection 
to create and maintain records for performers who are thirty 
years of age or older.  Id. at 331.  The court reasoned that the 
government need not employ the least speech-restrictive 
means of advancing its interest, and that one of Congress’s 
intentions in enacting the statute was to remove subjectivity 
of age verification.  Id.  Thus, the court concluded that § 2257 
satisfied intermediate scrutiny.   
The Sixth Circuit also rejected plaintiffs’ facial 
challenge.  Plaintiffs argued that § 2257 was overbroad 
because magazines depicting only “mature adult models” are 
subject to the statute.  Id. at 336.  The court rejected this 
argument because plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence 
demonstrating that such a situation existed, and in any event, 
plaintiffs did not demonstrate that such overbreadth was 
substantial because § 2257 complies with the First 
Amendment in most settings.  Id. at 336-37. 
Plaintiffs further argued that § 2257 was 
unconstitutionally overbroad because it applied to adult 
couples who create, but never distribute, a home video or 
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photograph of themselves engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct—an issue that was raised for the first time by the 
district court in its second decision granting summary 
judgment.  Id. at 336-37.  The government argued that, under 
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, § 2257 should be 
construed as applying only to pornography created for sale or 
trade, not depictions created by adults for private viewing in 
their homes.  Id. at 337-38.  The court concluded that § 2257 
was not overbroad but did not base its decision on 
constitutional avoidance.  Id.  Instead, the court found that 
“[b]ecause the plaintiffs did not raise this theory of 
unconstitutionality in their complaint or in the district court, 
the record [was] utterly barren about whether some, many, 
indeed any, American couples are affected by this proposed 
application of the statute—and, if so, in what ways.”  Id. at 
338.  The court further found that there was no evidence that 
the government ever enforced § 2257 in this setting and that 
the government asserted that it would not do so in the future.  
Id. at 339.  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district 
court and found that § 2257 was constitutional both as applied 
and facially. 
The dissents, however, asserted that § 2257, inter alia, 
was unconstitutionally overbroad and not narrowly tailored.  
Judge Kennedy concluded in his dissent that § 2257 was 
unconstitutionally overbroad because, inter alia, the statute 
applies to—and has a chilling effect on—private couples who 
produce or wish to produce depictions of their sexually 
explicit conduct and view those depictions in their homes.  Id. 
at 343-61 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).  Judge Moore concluded 
in her dissent that § 2257 was not narrowly tailored because 
the statute’s universal age-verification requirement applies to 
the old and young alike and the statute regulates depictions of 
all actual sexually explicit conduct, not just those depicting 
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what Congress ultimately sought to prevent.  Id. at 361-67 
(Moore, J. dissenting).   
B. PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM 
(1) AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE 
 Plaintiffs argue that the Statutes are content based, that 
strict scrutiny must therefore be applied, and that the Statutes 
cannot satisfy strict scrutiny.  In the alternative, Plaintiffs 
argue that even if the Statutes are content neutral, the Statutes 
cannot satisfy intermediate scrutiny.  As discussed infra, the 
District Court did not err in determining that the Statutes were 
content neutral and that intermediate scrutiny is applicable.  
However, we will vacate the District Court’s dismissal of 
Plaintiffs’ as-applied First Amendment claim because 
Plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to conduct 
discovery and develop the record regarding whether the 
Statutes are narrowly tailored. 
 (a) THE STATUTES ARE CONTENT NEUTRAL  
When determining whether a statute is content neutral, 
a principal consideration is “whether the government has 
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with 
the message it conveys,” or instead, adopted that regulation 
for some other purpose collateral to the protected speech.  
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.  In other words, “the government’s 
purpose is the controlling consideration,” and “[a] regulation 
that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is 
deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some 
speakers or messages but not others.”  Ward, 491 U.S. at 791-
92 (finding that sound-amplification regulations were content 
neutral because they sought to avoid undue intrusion into 
residential areas, not suppress free expression); see also Hill 
v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-20 (2000) (finding that a 
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statute creating buffer zones near health facilities was content 
neutral because it was enacted, inter alia, to protect patients’ 
privacy, not because of any disagreement with the speakers’ 
messages); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 
47-48 (1986) (finding that a zoning regulation for adult movie 
theaters was content neutral because it was promulgated to 
prevent crime and maintain property values, not to suppress 
the expression of unpopular speech). 
The Courts of Appeals that have considered the 
constitutionality of § 2257 have concluded that it is content 
neutral.  In Connection, the Sixth Circuit stated that   
Congress’s unanimous concern in enacting  
[§ 2257] was to deter the production and 
distribution of child pornography.  Congress 
singled out these types of pornography for 
regulation not because of their effect on 
audiences but because doing so was the only 
way to ensure that its existing ban on child 
pornography could be meaningfully enforced. 
* * * 
No doubt, § 2257 favors a particular viewpoint 
on this issue: Congress is against child 
pornography and is using this law to prevent it.  
Although that kind of viewpoint discrimination 
normally would be fatal to a law, that is not true 
here because the Constitution allows the 
government to embrace this viewpoint and to 
act on it . . . . 
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Connection, 557 F.3d at 328-29.9
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in American Library 
Association II found that “Congress enacted [§ 2257] not to 
regulate the content of sexually explicit materials, but to 
protect children by deterring the production and distribution 
of child pornography.”  33 F.3d at 86. 
  The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that § 2257 was content neutral because the statute 
has a “valid speech-related end—eliminating child 
pornography—followed by a means of achieving that end, a 
proof-of-age requirement that refers to the content of the 
speech . . . not because of its effect on the audience but 
because it is the kind of speech that implicates the 
government’s ban on child pornography.”  Id. at 329.   
We agree with the Sixth and D.C. Circuits that the 
Statutes are content neutral.10
                                                          
9 It is long-settled that child pornography depicting actual 
children is not protected under the First Amendment.  New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982); see also United 
States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Moreland, 665 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 2011).   
  Congress enacted the Statutes 
for the purpose of protecting children from exploitation by 
pornographers.  Congress singled out the types of depictions 
covered by the Statutes not because of their effect on 
audiences or any disagreement with their underlying message 
but because doing so was the only pragmatic way to enforce 
its ban on child pornography.  Any impact by the Statutes on 
 
10 Although Connection and American Library Association 
address only § 2257, not § 2257A, we are satisfied that their 
analysis applies with equal force to § 2257A, and the parties 
have not argued otherwise.   
 
25 
 
Plaintiffs’ protected speech is collateral to the Statutes’ 
purpose of protecting children from pornographers.    
Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Statutes are content 
based are unavailing.  Plaintiffs concede that the 
government’s purpose in enacting the Statutes is the 
controlling inquiry.  Plaintiffs, nevertheless, argue that the 
Statutes are content based because they do not serve purposes 
unrelated to the content of the speech that they seek to 
regulate.  Plaintiffs, however, are conflating protected speech 
and unprotected speech.  The Statutes serve purposes 
unrelated to the content of Plaintiffs’ protected speech—
namely the protection of children against sexual exploitation 
and the elimination of child pornography.  That a statute 
refers to the content of Plaintiffs’ protected expression does 
not necessarily render it content based.  See, e.g., Renton, 475 
U.S. at 47 (finding that a zoning regulation was content 
neutral even though it treated adult movie theaters differently 
from other types of theaters based on the content of the films 
exhibited); see also Connection, 557 F.3d 328 (citing Ward, 
491 U.S. at 791) (concluding that § 2257 was content neutral 
even though it did not “entirely ignore the content of the 
producers’ images”).   
To demonstrate that a restriction is content based and 
thus subject to strict scrutiny, Plaintiffs must show that the 
Statutes single out speech for special treatment because of the 
effect that speech will have on its audience.  See United 
States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-12 
(2000) (finding the essence of content-based regulations are 
those that focus on the content of the speech and the direct 
impact that speech has on listeners); see also Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (holding that a statute is content 
based where its justification “focuses only on the content of 
the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its 
listeners”) (emphasis omitted); Connection, 557 F.3d at 328.  
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Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Congress enacted the 
Statutes because of the effects their speech will have on the 
audience.11
                                                          
11 Plaintiffs further point to the § 2257A(h)(1) commercial 
certification exception to support their argument that the 
Statutes are content based.  Plaintiffs reason that, under this 
exception, depictions of simulated sexually explicit conduct 
may be exempted from the Statutes, but that no such 
exemption is provided for depictions of actual sexually 
explicit conduct generally.  Plaintiffs conclude that this 
distinction is based solely on the content of the expression at 
issue.  However, the commercial certification exception—
though it is defined in part by the content of the depiction 
being produced—was not enacted solely because of any 
disagreement with the message conveyed by that content.  
Instead, Congress provided this exception for those producers 
that it believed were subject to other regulatory schemes that 
adequately achieve the same age-verification ends as the 
Statutes.  As Senator Patrick Leahy explained, the 
commercial certification exception was necessary because 
certain commercial industries, including the motion picture 
industry, “currently operate[] under a panoply of laws, both 
civil and criminal, as well as regulations and labor 
agreements governing the employment of children in any 
production,” and thus burdening these producers would not 
substantially further Congress’s intent of protecting children.  
152 Cong. Rec. S8012-02, S8027 (July 20, 2006). 
Consequently, Plaintiffs’ reliance on § 2257A(h)(1) is 
misplaced.   
  Accordingly, we conclude that the Statutes are 
content neutral.             
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(b) THE INTERMEDIATE                        
SCRUTINY ANALYSIS 
We apply intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral 
regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds.  See 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 
(2010); Conchatta Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 267 (3d Cir. 
2006).  A statute satisfies intermediate scrutiny where it: (1) 
advances a “substantial” governmental interest; (2) does not 
“burden substantially more speech than is necessary” (i.e., the 
statute must be narrowly tailored); and (3) leaves open 
“ample alternative channels for communication.”  Ward, 491 
U.S. at 791, 798-800.  A statute may satisfy intermediate 
scrutiny even though it is not the “least restrictive or least 
intrusive” means of furthering the government’s substantial 
interest.  Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.       
The Statutes clearly advance a substantial 
governmental interest—protecting children from sexual 
exploitation by pornographers.  The Statutes combat child 
pornography in at least four specific ways: (1) they ensure 
that primary producers of sexually explicit expression 
confirm the ages of their performers prior to filming; (2) they 
permit secondary producers that publish the depictions to 
verify that the performers were not children; (3) they prevent 
children from passing themselves off as adults; and (4) they 
aid law enforcement and eliminate subjective disputes with 
producers over whether the producer should have verified the 
age of a particular performer.  See Connection, 557 F.3d at 
329-30.   
Plaintiffs concede that protecting children from 
exploitation by pornographers is an “important, indeed 
compelling, governmental interest.”  Pls.’ Br. at 24.  
However, Plaintiffs argue that the government failed to 
demonstrate that the Statutes advance that particular interest 
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or that the problems identified are real, not conjectural.  Id. 
24-25.  We are not persuaded.  Both the Report and 
Congress’s findings related to the 2006 Act expressed that an 
extensive interstate market for child pornography continued 
to exist and that children were still at risk for sexual 
exploitation by pornographers.  Report at 608-09; 2006 Act  
§ 501(1)(B).  The Report further determined that the 
pornography industry’s practice of employing youthful-
looking performers made it nearly impossible for law 
enforcement officers to effectively investigate potential child 
pornography.  Report at 618.  The Report recommended that, 
to remedy these problems, Congress impose recordkeeping 
and labeling requirements similar to those Congress 
ultimately adopted in the Statutes.12
                                                          
12 The concurrence similarly asserts that the government has 
not demonstrated that the Statutes advance the government’s 
interest of protecting children in a direct and effective way.  
We disagree.  Notably, the other Circuits that have considered 
the constitutionality of § 2257 have determined that it 
advances the aforementioned interest.  See, e.g., Am. Library 
II, 33 F.3d at 88 (“[I]t seems obvious to us that, as a general 
matter, the requirements of section 2257 advance the 
abatement of child pornography in fundamental ways.”); 
Connection, 557 F.3d at 329-30.  At a minimum, the Statutes’ 
requirement that producers review each performer’s 
identification directly and effectively prevents minors from 
passing themselves off as adults.   
  Consequently, the 
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District Court did not err in concluding that the government 
adequately demonstrated that the Statutes advance the 
substantial interest of protecting children.13
Nonetheless, we will vacate the District Court’s 
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ as-applied First Amendment claim 
(Count 1) and remand it for further proceedings because 
Plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to conduct 
discovery and develop the record regarding whether the 
Statutes are narrowly tailored.  Narrow tailoring is satisfied 
where the statute at issue does not “burden substantially more 
speech than is necessary to further the government’s 
legitimate interests.”  Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.  Thus, the issue 
before us is whether the Statutes burden substantially more of 
Plaintiffs’ speech than is necessary to further the 
government’s legitimate interest of protecting children.  This 
question is particularly difficult here because we are 
reviewing a motion to dismiss and have before us only the 
       
                                                                                                                                  
      Moreover, we are not persuaded by the concurrence’s 
position that if a statute could be unlawfully circumvented 
(e.g., by falsifying records or operating underground), then it 
may not advance the government’s interest.  We are aware of 
no authority that supports such a proposition.  Many statutes, 
including those banning the production and possession of 
child pornography, are regularly violated.  Nonetheless, these 
statutes, like §§ 2257 and 2257A, still advance the 
government’s interest of protecting children in a direct and 
effective way.   
   
13 The District Court also did not err in concluding that the 
Statutes leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication.  The Statutes regulate recordkeeping and 
labeling procedures and do not ban or otherwise limit speech.  
Plaintiffs have not argued otherwise.  
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allegations and exhibits in the complaint, orders issued in the 
action, and other matters of public record.  See, e.g., Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (listing the types of documents 
courts may consider on motions to dismiss).14
Construing the complaint in a light most favorable to 
Plaintiffs—our task on a motion to dismiss, Phillips v. Cnty. 
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008)—we are 
confronted with allegations that the Statutes are not narrowly 
tailored and fail intermediate scrutiny because they 
“unconstitutionally restrict and burden a vast amount of 
constitutionally protected expression that Plaintiffs produce,” 
including depictions of “adults engaged in simulated or actual 
sexually explicit conduct.”  See Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Dkt.  
# 1 at ¶ 51.  Plaintiffs, of course, are required only to make a 
“short and plain statement of the claim” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8, and the government does not challenge the factual 
sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim.     
   
The government asserts that the Statutes are narrowly 
tailored because uniform recordkeeping and labeling 
procedures are necessary for producers regardless of the 
actual or apparent ages of the performers.  According to the 
government, a uniform rule is necessary because sexually 
explicit images of adults often cannot be distinguished from 
images showing minors and such a rule eliminates 
subjectivity as to which performers’ ages must be verified.  
This argument, however, is in the abstract and may not 
necessarily apply to all Plaintiffs.  For example, if one of the 
Plaintiffs employs performers that no reasonable person could 
conclude were minors, then that plaintiff may be able to 
demonstrate that the Statutes burden substantially more of 
                                                          
14 Neither Connection nor American Library Association was 
decided on a motion to dismiss.    
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that plaintiff’s speech than is necessary to protect children 
from sexual exploitation.  See, e.g., Am. Library II, 33 F.3d at 
90 (observing that some applications of the statute, such as to 
“an illustrated sex manual for the elderly” may be 
unconstitutional).  On the other hand, if any of the Plaintiffs 
produces depictions of predominantly youthful-looking 
performers, then the Statutes may be narrowly tailored as to 
those Plaintiffs.  In sum, on this record, we cannot accurately 
compare the amount of Plaintiffs’ constitutionally-protected 
speech that does not implicate the government’s interest in 
protecting children (e.g., speech involving performers who 
are obviously adults) to the amount of Plaintiffs’ speech that 
implicates the government’s interest (e.g., speech involving 
performers who are not obviously adults).  This comparison is 
essential to our narrow tailoring analysis, and Plaintiffs must 
be afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery and develop 
a record supporting their claim that the Statutes burden 
substantially more speech than is necessary. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
insofar as it dismisses Plaintiffs’ as-applied First Amendment 
claim (Count 1) and remand the claim for further 
proceedings. 
  (2) FACIAL CHALLENGE 
Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a 
party may bring a facial challenge against a statute, even 
though it is not unconstitutional as applied to that particular 
party, because “the statute’s very existence may cause others 
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected 
speech or expression.”  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601, 612 (1973); see also Members of the City Council of the 
City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798-99 
(1984); Borden v. Sch. Dist. of the Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 
F.3d 153, 165 (3d Cir. 2008).  Declaring a statute 
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unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds is “strong medicine” 
and should be used “sparingly and only as a last resort.”  
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.  Consequently, “a single 
impermissible application” cannot invalidate a statute.  
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 772.  Instead, a law may be invalidated as 
overbroad only if “a substantial number of its applications are 
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep.”  Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, n.6 (2008); see also 
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010); 
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 770; Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.  
Because “[t]he concept of ‘substantial overbreadth’ is not 
readily reduced to an exact definition,” Vincent, 466 U.S. at 
800, the challenge is in determining at what point the invalid 
applications of the statute become substantial compared to the 
valid applications.  When making such a determination, we 
consider four factors: (1) “the number of valid applications” 
of the statute; (2) “the historic or likely frequency of 
conceivably impermissible applications”; (3) “the nature of 
the activity or conduct sought to be regulated”; and (4) “the 
nature of the state interest underlying the regulation.”  Gibson 
v. Mayor and Council of the City of Wilmington, 355 F.3d 
215, 226 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted); see also Borden, 523 F.3d at 165.  Thus, a 
significant consideration in overbreadth analyses is the 
likelihood and frequency of invalid applications of the statute 
compared to valid applications.  See, e.g., Gibson, 355 F.3d at 
228.     
We conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing 
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment facial claim (Count 1).  As stated 
supra, Congress enacted the Statutes to protect children from 
sexual exploitation.  The Statutes, though, apply to more than 
those producers who sexually exploit children.  They mandate 
compliance by “[w]hoever produces” sexually explicit 
33 
 
depictions regardless of the performers’ actual or apparent 
ages.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2257(a), 2257A(a).  Plaintiffs 
assert that a “vast quantity” of protected sexually explicit 
depictions include performers who are “clearly mature adults” 
that “could not be mistaken for children.”  Pls.’ Br. at 41.   
The degree of the asserted overbreadth is obviously the 
critical determination, but Plaintiffs were never afforded the 
opportunity to conduct discovery or develop a record from 
which we could determine this degree.  Without some notion 
of both the amount of speech that implicates the 
government’s interest in protecting children (e.g., depictions 
of performers who reasonably could be minors based on their 
apparent ages) and the amount of speech that is burdened but 
does not further the government’s interest (e.g., depictions of 
performers who are obviously adults), we cannot intelligently 
weigh the legitimate versus problematic applications of the 
Statutes. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs should be permitted to develop 
the record as to whether the Statutes are unconstitutionally 
overbroad based on their purported regulation of purely 
private conduct.  Plaintiffs assert that the Statutes are 
substantially overbroad because they burden the entire 
universe of constitutionally protected expression involving 
sexually oriented images of adults—including private, 
noncommercial depictions created and viewed by adults in 
their homes.   
The government counters that, under the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance, the Statutes’ scope should be 
narrowly construed as applying only to depictions of actual or 
simulated sexually explicit conduct created for sale or trade, 
and thus, producers of purely private depictions would not be 
subject to the Statutes.  In support of this position, the 
government cites the preamble to the regulations, which states 
that the government interprets the Statutes as being “limited 
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to pornography intended for sale or trade.”  73 Fed. Reg. at 
77,456.  The government also points to specific terms in  
§ 2257 that it asserts speak primarily to the creation of images 
for industry distribution, such as “sexual performers,” “places 
of business,” and “normal business hours.”   
We conclude that the Statutes are not susceptible to 
such a limiting construction.  Although we are mindful that 
facial overbreadth is not to be invoked where a “limiting 
construction has been or could be placed on the challenged 
statute,” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, such limiting 
constructions are available only if the statute is “readily 
susceptible to such a construction.”  Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 
1592 (citations and quotation marks omitted).15
                                                          
15 The government asserts that Stevens is inapposite to the 
instant matter.  In Stevens, the government argued that a 
statute prohibiting depictions of “animal cruelty” was not 
overbroad because it could be construed as prohibiting only 
“extreme” cruelty and the government has not  prosecuted for 
anything less than extreme cruelty.  See, e.g., Stevens, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1582, 1591.  The Supreme Court rejected this 
argument, stating that “the First Amendment protects against 
the Government” and “does not leave us at the mercy of 
noblesse oblige.”  Id.  The government argues that the instant 
matter is distinguishable because the government 
promulgated its limiting interpretation of the Statutes in the 
regulations and is not relying on mere prosecutorial discretion 
as in Stevens.   
  Thus, 
We disagree and interpret Stevens as concluding that a 
promise by the government that it will interpret statutory 
language in a narrow, constitutional manner cannot, without 
more, save a potentially unconstitutionally overbroad statute.  
See, e.g., Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591 (“We would not uphold 
an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government 
promised to use it responsibly.”).  The manner in which the 
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limiting constructions are not available where they require 
“rewriting, not just reinterpretation” of the statute.  Id.  Here, 
the plain language of the Statutes makes clear that they apply 
broadly to all producers of actual or simulated sexually 
explicit depictions regardless of whether those depictions 
were created for the purpose of sale or trade.  See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2257(a) and 2257A(a) (stating generally that 
“[w]hoever produces” any book or other matter containing 
“visual depictions” of actual or simulated “sexually explicit 
conduct” shall be subject to the Statutes).  It is axiomatic that 
regulations cannot supersede a federal statute.  In re 
Complaint of Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 85 F.3d 105, 111 
(3d Cir. 1996).  As a result, the plain text of the Statutes 
setting forth their broad scope must trump any conflicting 
statements contained within the preamble to the regulations, 
including the assertion that the Statutes are “limited to 
pornography intended for sale or trade.”  73 Fed. Reg. at 
77,456. 
The government’s position is further belied by the  
§ 2257A(h) commercial certification exception.  This 
exception expressly applies only to depictions “intended for 
                                                                                                                                  
government made such a promise—e.g., prosecutorial 
discretion as opposed to a regulatory pronouncement—is not, 
in our opinion, dispositive.  After all, there is no guarantee 
that the government’s current interpretation of the Statutes 
will remain unchanged.  The government’s interpretation that 
the Statutes are “limited to pornography intended for sale or 
trade,” was made in the preamble to the regulations.  See, e.g., 
73 Fed. Reg. at 77,456.  Limiting statements in regulatory 
preambles, like assurances of prosecutorial discretion, may 
one day be modified by the executive branch to permit the 
exercise of the Statutes’ full authority, which is the very 
concern at the heart of Stevens.   
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commercial distribution” or those “created as part of a 
commercial enterprise.”  18 U.S.C. § 2257A(h)(1)(A)(i) and 
(h)(1)(B)(ii).  If the Statutes were intended to apply only to 
depictions meant for industry distribution, as the government 
asserts, then § 2257A(h)’s requirement that the depictions be 
produced for commercial distribution would be surplusage.  
See, e.g., Tavarez v. Klingensmith, 372 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 
2004) (stating that where possible, courts are to give effect to 
every clause and word of a statute and be reluctant to treat 
statutory terms as mere surplusage).   
Similarly, the regulations’ definition of “producer” 
also belies the government’s position.  As discussed supra, 
the regulations define “producer” as a primary or secondary 
producer.  28 C.R.R. § 75.1(c).  A primary producer is 
defined as any person who creates a visual depiction of a 
human being engaged in actual or simulated sexually explicit 
conduct.  Id. at (c)(1).  The definition of a primary producer is 
silent as to whether the depiction must be intended for 
commercial distribution.  Id.  A secondary producer, 
however, is defined as any person who, inter alia, publishes a 
magazine or other matter containing a visual depiction of a 
human being engaged in actual or simulated sexually explicit 
conduct, which is “intended for commercial distribution.”  Id. 
at (c)(2) (emphasis added).  Thus, because the definition of 
“secondary producer” limits its scope to those depictions 
created for commercial distribution but the definition of 
“primary producer” does not, the clear implication is that 
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“primary producer” is not limited to those who create 
depictions for commercial distribution.16
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
dismissing Plaintiffs’ facial challenge brought pursuant to 
their First Amendment claim (Count 1) and remand this claim 
for further proceedings. 
   
(3) COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL  
In June 2005, FSC and Conners—in addition to 
others—brought an action in the District of Colorado 
captioned Free Speech Coalition, Inc. et al. v. Gonzales, No. 
1:05-cv-01126-WDM-BNB.  This action challenged the 
constitutionality of § 2257 on various grounds.   
The District of Colorado granted partial summary 
judgment for the government.  Free Speech Coal. v. 
Gonzales, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1076 (D. Colo. 2007) (“FSC 
II”).  As to FSC and Conners’ First Amendment claims, the 
District of Colorado found that intermediate scrutiny was 
appropriate because § 2257 and its regulations do not impose 
a prior restraint on speech and are content neutral.  Id. at 
1076.  The District of Colorado also held that, with two 
                                                          
16 We are also not persuaded by the government’s 
argument—at least at this point—that the amount of purely 
private conduct is “not only unknown but most likely 
unknowable because it involves the private sexual activity of 
Americans in their homes.”  Def.’s Br. at 54.  Attempting to 
ascertain the unknown is an essential aspect of our discovery 
process.  It is, therefore, generally preferable to permit the 
parties to conduct discovery before concluding that something 
is unknowable.   
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exceptions,17 § 2257 and its regulations satisfied intermediate 
scrutiny with respect to the First Amendment, and that the 
statute was not impermissibly vague or overbroad.  Id.18
Subsequent to the District of Colorado’s order on 
summary judgment in FSC II, the plaintiffs, including FSC 
and Conners, moved to alter or amend the court’s grant of 
partial summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 
because, inter alia, “the facts of the case [had] drastically 
changed since the government’s [summary judgment motion] 
   
                                                          
17 The District of Colorado found that the government did not 
move for summary judgment with respect to two aspects of 
the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.  These were: (1) a 
regulation requiring that plaintiffs maintain a copy of 
depictions from live Internet chat rooms; and (2) a regulation 
requiring that plaintiffs maintain a copy of any URL 
associated with a depiction published on the Internet 
regardless of whether the producer has control over the 
website which posts the depiction.  Compare FSC II, 483 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1076 & n.4 (stating that the government did not 
move for summary judgment with respect to the two 
exceptions noted in the court’s previous order) with Free 
Speech Coal. v. Gonzales, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1208-10 (D. 
Colo. 2005) (describing the two issues in detail).  
 
18 The District of Colorado further dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
claim that § 2257 violated the Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Incrimination Clause because the regulations require 
producers to maintain records only for inspection purposes 
and plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence that they were 
ever subjected to an inspection.  FSC II, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 
1080-81.  The District of Colorado also dismissed plaintiffs’ 
Fourth Amendment claim because plaintiffs failed to oppose 
the government’s motion as to this claim.  Id. at 1081. 
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and Free Speech Coalition’s response was filed.”  Free 
Speech Coal., Inc. v. Gonzales, 1:05-cv-01126-WDM-BNB, 
Dkt. # 112.  FSC and Conners concluded that the District of 
Colorado should “reopen the case to allow the parties to 
submit additional evidence on the applicability of 
intermediate scrutiny to various aspects [of] the § 2257 
record-keeping scheme.”  Id.  While the motion to amend was 
pending, plaintiffs—including FSC and Conners—moved for 
dismissal of the case without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 41(a)(2).  Id. at Dkt. # 143.  The government did not 
oppose plaintiffs’ motion for dismissal, and the District of 
Colorado granted the motion, dismissing the complaint 
without prejudice.  Id.   
In the instant matter, the District Court, relying on FSC 
II, found that FSC and Conners were collaterally estopped 
from maintaining their First Amendment challenge to  
§ 2257.19
 A plaintiff is generally precluded from reasserting the 
same issue that was subject to a final judgment during a 
previous adjudication.  See In re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 
(3d Cir. 1991).  There is no bright-line rule regarding what 
constitutes a “final judgment” for issue preclusion.  Instead, 
we have found that a prior adjudication of an issue in another 
action must be “sufficiently firm” to be accorded conclusive 
effect.  Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 
(1982)).  We have stated that “‘[f]inality for purposes of issue 
preclusion is a more ‘pliant’ concept than it would be in other 
contexts,’” and that finality “‘may mean little more than that 
  We disagree.     
                                                          
19 This alternative holding did not affect the claims by FSC 
and Conners regarding § 2257A or their claims challenging 
the constitutionality of § 2257 on grounds other than the First 
Amendment.  
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the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage 
that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be 
litigated again.’”  Id. (quoting Dyndul v. Dyndul, 620 F.2d 
409, 412 (3d Cir. 1980)).  Factors that courts consider when 
determining whether the prior determination was sufficiently 
firm include: “whether the parties were fully heard, whether a 
reasoned opinion was filed, and whether that decision could 
have been, or actually was, appealed.”  Id.  None of these 
factors appears to be determinative.          
 Although we find this to be a close call, we are not 
persuaded that FSC II was sufficiently firm to be afforded 
preclusive effect under the circumstances.  Subsequent to the 
District of Colorado’s order, FSC and Conners remained as 
parties in the action and continued to maintain certain 
challenges to § 2257 on First Amendment grounds.  The 
District of Colorado never issued a final judgment with 
respect to all claims brought by FSC and Conners, and thus, 
its order granting partial summary judgment was never 
appealable.  Moreover, a motion to amend that order was 
pending before the District of Colorado at the time that the 
court dismissed the complaint without prejudice.  The 
government neither requested a resolution of the motion to 
amend the order nor objected to the motion to dismiss the 
complaint without prejudice.  The government has not 
asserted—and there is nothing in the record to indicate—that 
FSC and Conners are either forum shopping or otherwise 
committing an abuse of process.   
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
to the extent that it dismissed the First Amendment claim by 
FSC and Conners based on collateral estoppel. 
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C. PLAINTIFFS’ FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM  
The Statutes require that producers make their 
individually identifiable records of the visual depictions 
“available to the Attorney General for inspection at all 
reasonable times.”  18 U.S.C. §§ 2257(c) and 2257A(c).  The 
regulations implementing the Statutes authorize investigators, 
at any reasonable time and without delay or advance notice, 
to enter any premises where a producer maintains its records 
to determine compliance with the recordkeeping requirements 
or other provisions of the Statutes.  28 C.F.R. § 75.5(a) and 
(b).  Producers must make these records available for 
inspection for at least twenty hours per week, and the records 
may be inspected only once during any four-month period 
unless there is reasonable suspicion to believe that a violation 
has occurred.  Id. § 75.5(c)(1) and (d). 
 Plaintiffs brought an as-applied and facial Fourth 
Amendment claim (Count 4), alleging that the Statutes and 
regulations unreasonably authorize the government to 
conduct warrantless searches and seizures.  Plaintiffs also 
sought leave to amend their Fourth Amendment claim and 
include an allegation that FSC and others were subjected to 
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inspections pursuant to § 2257.20
                                                          
20 Plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to include 
the following:  
  The District Court 
dismissed Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, holding that 
Plaintiffs had no objective expectation of privacy in the 
records, and that in any event, the government’s searches 
were permissible under the administrative search exception to 
 
Several of Free Speech Coalition’s members 
have been subjected to inspections pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 2257 and its implementing 
regulations.  In each instance, a team of FBI 
agents came to the member’s private business 
premises, without a warrant or prior notice, 
gained access under authority of 18 U.S.C. § 
2257 and its implementing regulations, entered 
areas of the business premises not open to the 
public, searched through the business’s files and 
records owned and possessed by the member 
pertaining to its sexually explicit expression and 
made copies of certain records.  The agents also 
took photos of the interior areas of the business 
premises-again, all without a warrant.  
Inspections have also been made by FBI agents 
of producers who are not members of Plaintiff 
Free Speech Coalition, and in two instances, 
upon information and belief, inspections were 
conducted at private residences of the producers 
because that is where their records were 
maintained. 
 
See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 
with Brief in Support, Dkt. # 49 at 4. 
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the Fourth Amendment.  The District Court further denied 
Plaintiffs motion to amend as futile.21
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. IV.   “If the search is reasonable, there is no 
constitutional problem, for the Fourth Amendment only 
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”  United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 182 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment’s 
scope extends beyond criminal investigations and protects 
against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by the government.  
See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2627 
(2010).   
  We will vacate the 
District Court’s order with respect to Plaintiffs claims under 
the Fourth Amendment, and remand for development of the 
record.  In particular, remand will permit the District Court to 
consider the impact, if any, of the recent Supreme Court 
decision in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
There are two ways in which the government’s 
conduct may constitute a “search” implicating the Fourth 
Amendment.  First, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when 
“the person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, a 
reasonable, or a legitimate expectation of privacy that has 
been invaded by government action.”  Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citations and quotation marks omitted); 
see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001) 
(“[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government 
violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society 
                                                          
21 According to the District Court, the amendment would 
neither remedy Plaintiffs’ lack of an expectation of privacy in 
the records nor overcome the administrative search exception. 
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recognizes as reasonable.”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 353 (1967) (“The Government’s activities in 
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words 
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied . . . and 
thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.”).  Determining whether one’s 
expectation of privacy is justifiable involves two separate 
inquiries: (1) whether the individual demonstrated an actual 
or subjective expectation of privacy in the subject of the 
search or seizure; and (2) whether this expectation of privacy 
is objectively justifiable under the circumstances.  Smith, 442 
U.S. at 740 (quotation marks omitted); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring); United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 
994 (3d Cir. 1985). 
Second, as the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Jones makes clear, a Fourth Amendment search also occurs 
where the government unlawfully, physically occupies private 
property for the purpose of obtaining information.  See 132 S. 
Ct. at 949-52 (stating that the reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test set forth in Katz was “added to, not substituted 
for, the common-law trespassory test”) (emphasis in original).  
Under this analysis, we must determine whether the 
government committed common-law trespass when obtaining 
the information.  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-52; see also 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (explaining the 
common-law-trespass test employed prior to Katz).  If such a 
trespass occurs, then the government’s actions constitute a 
search implicating the Fourth Amendment.  See Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. at 949-52.     
Here, the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ 
Fourth Amendment claim, as sought to be amended.  Courts 
generally must consider the concrete factual context when 
determining the constitutional validity of a warrantless 
search.  See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968) 
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(declining to hold whether a particular statute was facially 
invalid under the Fourth Amendment because the 
“constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-
eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in 
the concrete factual context of the individual case”); United 
States ex rel. McArthur v. Rundle, 402 F.2d 701, 704-05 (3d 
Cir. 1968) (stating that in the case of warrantless searches, 
courts are required to consider the concrete factual context); 
see also United States v. $291,828.00 in United States 
Currency, 536 F.3d 1234, 1238 (11th Cir. 2008).  Plaintiffs’ 
complaint, as amended, would allege that government 
officials searched and/or seized without a warrant—and in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment—the premises and effects 
of certain FSC members and others.  The record, however, is 
not clear as to: which specific members of FSC were 
searched; when and where the searches of the FSC members 
and others occurred (i.e., offices or homes); and the conduct 
of the government during the search (e.g., what specific 
information the government reviewed and whether the 
government exceeded its authority under the applicable 
regulations).22
This factual context is necessary for determining 
whether the government’s conduct was a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment pursuant to either the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test set forth in Katz or the common-
law-trespass test described in Jones.  As to the Katz analysis, 
we cannot conclude on this record whether plaintiffs have an 
objective expectation of privacy in the searched areas and 
effects unless the contours of the alleged searches are more 
   
                                                          
22 The government argues that Plaintiffs’ as-applied Fourth 
Amendment claim is legally groundless, but does not assert 
that this claim—as potentially amended—is factually 
insufficient.  See Def.’s Br. at 60-69.  
  
46 
 
fully delineated.  Likewise, an analysis under Jones would 
benefit from a more developed record because the court must 
conclude whether a common-law trespass occurred during 
any of the alleged searches, which is traditionally a fact-
intensive inquiry.   
 Moreover, further development of the record is 
necessary to determine whether the administrative search 
exception to the expectation-of-privacy test is applicable.  An 
owner or operator of a business may have an expectation of 
privacy in commercial property that society is prepared to 
consider reasonable.  See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 
699 (1987); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
Such an expectation “exists . . . with respect to administrative 
inspections designed to enforce regulatory statutes.”  Burger, 
482 U.S. at 700; see also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 
307, 312-13 (1978).  This expectation, however, is “different 
from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an 
individual’s home,” and it is “particularly attenuated in 
commercial property employed in ‘closely regulated’ 
industries.”  Burger, 482 U.S. at 700.  Certain industries have 
such a history of government oversight that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy could exist.  See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 
313; Burger, 482 U.S. at 700.  Factors to consider when 
determining whether a particular industry is closely regulated 
include: duration of the regulation’s existence, pervasiveness 
of the regulatory scheme, and regularity of the regulation’s 
application.  See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 605-06 
(1981).   
Once a business is determined to be part of a closely 
regulated industry, then we must decide whether the alleged 
warrantless search was reasonable.  See Burger, 482 U.S. at 
702.  Warrantless searches of closely regulated businesses are 
reasonable where the following criteria are met: (1) the 
regulatory scheme furthers a substantial government interest; 
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(2) the warrantless inspections are necessary to further the 
regulatory scheme; and (3) the inspection program, in terms 
of certainty and regularity of its application, is a 
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.  Burger, 
482 U.S. at 702-03.     
We cannot determine the applicability of the 
administrative search exception based on the record before us.  
The nature and manner of the search are critical factors when 
determining both whether an industry is closely regulated and 
the reasonableness of the particular search.  For example, the 
record is unclear as to: the frequency and extensiveness of the 
alleged searches; whether the alleged searches occurred 
exclusively on commercial premises; and whether the 
Plaintiffs who were subjected to the alleged searches were 
engaged in commercial activities within a particular industry.  
Thus, further development of the record is necessary.23
As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion for 
leave to amend their Fourth Amendment claim should be 
granted.  Leave to amend should be freely given when justice 
so requires, including for a curative amendment unless such 
an amendment would be inequitable or futile.  See Toll Bros., 
    
                                                          
23 We cannot agree with the concurrence’s assertion that, at 
this time, we should conclude there is “no set of facts” that 
could justify the application of the administrative search 
exception.  This matter is before us on a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6).  The government has yet to file a 
responsive pleading, and the parties have not begun the 
discovery process.  As discussed supra, the parties must be 
allowed to develop the factual contours of their Fourth 
Amendment claims and defenses.  Accordingly, we will not 
prejudge the validity of any claim or defense prior to the 
creation of that record.      
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Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 144 n.10 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment is not futile because, 
as discussed supra, their Fourth Amendment claim, with the 
proposed amendment, would withstand a motion to dismiss.  
See, e.g., Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1431 (3d Cir. 
1989).  Also, granting leave to amend is not inequitable 
because, inter alia, the pleadings were not closed and the 
government has not asserted any substantial prejudice. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
dismissing Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim (Count 4) and 
denying Plaintiffs leave to amend their Fourth Amendment 
claim.  We will remand this claim for further proceedings.     
D. ADDITIONAL CLAIMS  
 It is well settled that appellants must “set forth the 
issues raised on appeal and to present an argument in support 
of those issues in their opening brief.”  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 
F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).  “[I]f an appellant fails to 
comply with these requirements on a particular issue, the 
appellant normally has abandoned and waived that issue on 
appeal and it need not be addressed by the court of appeals.”  
Id.   
Here, Plaintiffs listed additional claims that they 
argued before the District Court, including that the Statutes: 
unconstitutionally suppressed anonymous speech; imposed a 
prior restraint on protected expression; unconstitutionally 
imposed strict liability for failing to create and maintain the 
requisite records; violated equal protection of the laws; were 
unconstitutionally vague; and violated the privilege against 
self-incrimination.  Pls.’ Br. at 58-59.  Plaintiffs did not 
include any argument with respect to these claims or 
otherwise explain how the District Court erred in dismissing 
them.  Accordingly, we conclude that Plaintiffs abandoned 
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any issues with respect to these claims, and we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of them.       
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order to the extent that it: dismissed in their 
entirety Plaintiffs’ claims brought pursuant to the First 
Amendment (Count 1) and the Fourth Amendment (Count 4); 
dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief (Count 6) to 
the extent that it asserts a right to injunctive relief for 
violations of the First Amendment or the Fourth Amendment; 
and denied Plaintiffs leave to amend their Fourth Amendment 
claim (Count 4).  We will affirm the District Court’s order in 
all other respects and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with the foregoing opinion.  
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge
 
, concurring.  
I agree with the majority that the District Court acted 
prematurely when it dismissed plaintiffs’ First and Fourth 
Amendment claims at the pleading stage, and, accordingly, 
concur in the judgment.  I write separately to express my 
disagreement with the majority’s reasoning regarding two 
substantive aspects of those claims:  whether we can 
conclude, based on this record, that 18 U.S.C. §§ 2257 and 
2257A advance a substantial government interest, as required 
to satisfy intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment, 
and whether the administrative-search exception to the 
warrant requirement can apply to plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
 
I. 
 
The majority correctly points out that the first step of 
the First Amendment intermediate-scrutiny analysis asks 
whether the challenged regulations advance a “substantial” 
governmental interest.  Maj. Op. 27.  While I agree, as the 
plaintiffs do, that the government’s interest in protecting 
children and preventing child pornography is substantial, I 
cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the 
government has “adequately demonstrated” at this stage of 
the litigation that sections 2257 and 2257A advance that 
interest.  See Maj. Op. 29.   
 
The Supreme Court has found this prong of the 
intermediate-scrutiny test satisfied where record evidence 
establishes that the challenged regulation serves the 
government’s interests “in a direct and effective way.”  
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 213 (1997) 
2 
 
(“Turner II”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).  In 
my view, no evidence in the record here — which, given the 
case’s procedural posture, is extremely sparse — establishes a 
“direct and effective” connection between the government’s 
interest in preventing child pornography and the extensive 
and burdensome recordkeeping, labeling, and inspection 
requirements imposed by sections 2257 and 2257A. 
 
Like the District Court, the majority is persuaded that 
the recommendation in the 1986 Report of the Attorney 
General’s Commission on Pornography (the “Pornography 
Report”) that Congress should enact section 2257, based on 
the Commission’s findings that a market for child 
pornography continued despite previous legislative efforts to 
stop it and that producers of sexually explicit images often 
use young-looking performers, satisfies the government’s 
burden as to this aspect of the test.  See Maj. Op. 28.  I am not 
so persuaded.  Neither the District Court nor the majority 
points to anything — in the Pornography Report, the 
legislative history, or elsewhere — that asserts that, or 
explains how, these statutes provide an effective response to 
the problems the Pornography Report and Congress 
diagnosed.1
                                                 
1  My own assessment is that the evidence and reasoning set 
forth in the Pornography Report regarding the recordkeeping 
requirements are quite thin.  The Report finds in some detail 
that the type of child pornography that persisted after federal 
and state bans were enacted was distinct from the adult-
entertainment industry, mostly non-commercial in nature, and 
involved people who were unlikely to be deterred by criminal 
sanctions.  See, e.g., Pornography Report 406 (“[T]he 
  Moreover, although section 2257 has been on the 
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books for almost 25 years, the record contains no evidence as 
to producers’ or the government’s experience under the 
statute, and, therefore, no means of assessing whether the 
requirements actually have had any deterrent or preventive 
effect.2
                                                                                                             
industry of child pornography is largely distinct from any 
aspect of the industry of producing and making available 
sexually explicit materials involving adults.”); id. at 410 
(“The greatest bulk of child pornography is produced by child 
abusers themselves in largely ‘cottage industry’ fashion, and 
thus child pornography must be considered as substantially 
inseparable from the problem of sexual abuse of children.”); 
id. at 610 (“Wholly commercial operations appear to be 
extremely unusual . . . .”); id. (“However strong the criminal 
law, sexual exploitation of children is likely to remain an 
irresistible temptation for some.”).  The recommendation that 
Congress enact a recordkeeping statute, by contrast, grew out 
of an observation that commercial pornographers use models 
that look “as young as possible,” id. at 855, and an assertion 
that “[t]he growth of pseudo child pornography has made it 
increasingly difficult for law enforcement officers to ascertain 
whether an individual in a film or other visual depiction is a 
minor,” id. at 618.  The Report does not cite any evidence of 
the use of performers who are actually underaged or the 
asserted law-enforcement difficulties. 
   
 
2  Some relevant questions in this regard include:  Do 
producers of sexually explicit materials actually keep the 
required records?  Have they ceased using underage subjects?  
How does the Department of Justice enforce the statutes or 
regulations?  How many people have been prosecuted under 
sections 2257 and 2257A?  The Pornography Report’s 
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In the absence of such evidence, it is easy to think of 
reasons the statutes might not accomplish their desired result.  
For example, given the substantial federal and state criminal 
penalties for creating and distributing child pornography, see 
generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254, 2256; Pornography 
Report 602-08 (summarizing federal and state child 
pornography laws), and the Pornography Report’s finding 
that “[s]exual exploitation of children has retreated to the 
shadows,” id. at 609-10, it is hard to fathom that the statutes’ 
recordkeeping requirements would make anyone who was 
already inclined to engage in such activities change his 
behavior.  An unscrupulous producer who seeks to distribute 
images using underaged (as opposed to merely young-
looking) performers could falsify his records, and a producer 
who operates underground is not likely to follow the 
recordkeeping requirements at all.  Similarly, a child 
determined to pass herself off as an adult could easily provide 
false identification to the producer.   
 
I am mindful, of course, that we owe deference to 
Congress’s predictive judgments as to whether a statute will 
materially alleviate the substantial harm it is designed to 
address.  Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195.  But we retain an 
“obligation . . . ‘to assure that, in formulating its judgments, 
Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on 
substantial evidence.’”  Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (“Turner I”)).  In this case, 
the Pornography Report’s ipse dixit forms the only link 
                                                                                                             
discussion of enforcement of the federal child pornography 
laws provides an example of the type of data the government 
might supply to answer these questions.  See Pornography 
Report 415-16. 
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between the statute and the asserted harms.  There has been 
no showing that Congress made any predictive judgment 
about the statutes’ likely effects, much less a determination 
that any such judgments were “reasonable” or “based on 
substantial evidence.”   
 
For these reasons, I would have asked the District 
Court to explore this issue more fully on remand rather than 
affirming the District Court’s determination that the 
government established that sections 2257 and 2257A 
advance its substantial interest in preventing child 
pornography at the motion to dismiss stage. 
 
II. 
 
The majority remands plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment 
claims for further development of the record concerning 
whether the searches alleged in this case constitute common-
law trespass under United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012), and whether the administrative-search exception 
applies.  Maj. Op. 43-47.  I agree that the record does not 
provide enough information for us to determine the impact of 
Jones, but I disagree with the majority as to the need for 
further consideration of the administrative-search exception.  
In my view, no set of facts could justify the application of that 
exception to a warrantless inspection conducted under section 
2257 or 2257A. 
 
As in all Fourth Amendment cases, we begin with the 
general requirement that “Fourth Amendment protections 
require law enforcement officers to procure and execute a 
warrant before conducting a search.”  Showers v. Spangler, 
182 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Marshall v. 
6 
 
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1978) (“[T]he Warrant 
Clause applies to inspections for compliance with regulatory 
statutes.”).  The administrative-search doctrine is one of “a 
few well recognized exceptions” to the warrant requirement, 
but its scope “is extremely limited.”  Showers, 182 F.3d at 
172.   
 
As a threshold matter, the statute and regulations must 
target businesses within a “pervasively regulated” industry to 
qualify for the exception.  See Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 313.  
Whether a particular industry satisfies that test depends on 
“‘the pervasiveness and regularity of the federal regulation,’” 
the “effect of such regulation upon an owner’s expectation of 
privacy,” and “‘the duration of a particular regulatory 
scheme.’”  New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 701 (1987).  
Assuming the statute and regulations apply to a pervasively 
regulated industry, the warrantless inspections they authorize 
must satisfy three requirements to qualify as “reasonable” 
under the Fourth Amendment:  (1) “there must be a 
‘substantial’ government interest that informs the regulatory 
scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made”; (2) “the 
warrantless inspections must be ‘necessary to further [the] 
regulatory scheme’”; and (3) “‘the statute’s inspection 
program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its 
application, [must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate 
substitute for a warrant.’”  Id. at 702-03 (alterations in 
original).   
 
At least two aspects of that analysis are problematic in 
this case.  First, sections 2257 and 2257A do not target a 
“pervasively regulated” industry.  Indeed, the statutes and 
their associated regulations are not specifically directed at any 
industry at all — as the majority properly concludes, they 
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govern purely private conduct and sexually explicit images 
that are traded clandestinely and over the Internet, as well as 
commercially produced pornography.  Maj. Op. 34-37.  But 
even if we were to ignore that fact and assume, contrary to 
their plain language, that sections 2257 and 2257A do 
specifically target the adult-entertainment industry, I do not 
see how we could conclude that industry is “pervasively 
regulated” as the term has been applied.   
 
The District Court relied on the “steadily strengthening 
web” of statutes enacted over the last thirty years to “protect[] 
children from sexual exploitation” to conclude that the adult-
entertainment industry is “pervasively regulated.”  Free 
Speech Coal., Inc. v. Holder, 729 F. Supp. 2d 691, 753 (E.D. 
Pa. 2010).  But the statutes to which it refers are general 
criminal prohibitions on the creation and distribution of child 
pornography; they are not specific regulations governing the 
way that commercial, adult pornographers conduct their 
business.  Cf. Frey v. Panza, 621 F.2d 596, 598 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(per curiam) (affirming application of administrative-search 
exception to warrantless inspections of houses under 
construction in part because the municipal building code 
under which the inspections were conducted “is directed 
specifically and exclusively at that one industry”).  Moreover, 
as general, criminal statutes, they do not imply any 
diminution in an adult-entertainment producer’s expectations 
of privacy.  At the very least, the government has not shown, 
and it seems to me that it would be difficult for it to show, 
that the adult-entertainment industry is governed by the type 
of specific, extensive, and intrusive safety or health 
regulations that exist in other industries — liquor distribution, 
gun sales, stone quarrying and mining, automobile junkyards, 
veterinary drugs, transportation of hazardous materials — that 
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courts have deemed pervasively regulated for purposes of the 
administrative-search exception.  See United States v. 4,432 
Mastercases of Cigarettes, 448 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 
2006) (listing “closely regulated” industries subject to 
administrative-search exception). 
 
Second, the warrantless inspection regime created by 
sections 2257 and 2257A is not necessary to further the 
statutes’ purpose.  This is not a case where the government 
must conduct random, unannounced inspections of a business 
premises to ensure health and safety (as, for example, in the 
case of mine inspections, see Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 
594, 603 (1981) (noting the “notorious history of serious 
accidents and unhealthful working conditions” in the mining 
industry)).3
                                                 
3  The District Court finessed this issue by tying the 
inspections to the prevention of the sexual exploitation of 
children, see Free Speech Coalition, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 754, 
but that link is attenuated at best.  The inspections do nothing 
to ensure compliance with the criminal laws’ substantive 
prohibitions on creating or distributing child pornography; 
they only test compliance with the recordkeeping 
requirements of sections 2257 and 2257A. 
  In fact, such inspections are not even needed to 
ensure compliance with the statutes.  The District Court 
reasoned that a warrantless inspection program “encourages 
producers to follow the age-verification procedures regularly 
and in advance of the production of the depictions, and deters 
the possibility of fabrication or after-the-fact compilation of 
such information.”  Free Speech Coalition, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 
754.  But the amount and nature of the information the 
statutes and regulations require producers to record 
(performers’ names, dates of birth, and aliases; copies of the 
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performers’ identification; a copy of the depiction; and the 
date of the original production of the depiction, see 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2257(b), 2257A(b); 28 C.F.R. § 75.2(a)) and their 
complicated indexing requirements (records must be 
organized alphabetically by performer’s name and indexed or 
cross referenced by the performers’ aliases and the title of the 
production, see 28 C.F.R. § 75.2(a)(3)) make it exceedingly 
unlikely that producers could fabricate and compile such 
records after the fact on short notice, as would be required to 
comply with a subpoena or warrant.   
 
More fundamentally, inspections of the required 
records could be conducted using warrants with no greater 
difficulty, and with no different results, than without.  
Warrants could issue on cause to believe that the producer is 
using child subjects in violation of the law based on 
appearance, as is always the case, or as part of “an 
administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria.”  
Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 323; see also Martin v. Int’l Matex 
Tank Terminals—Bayonne, 928 F.2d 614, 622 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(explaining that probable cause for an administrative warrant 
may arise out of either “specific evidence of a violation” or 
“an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria”).  
Tellingly, neither the government nor the District Court has 
explained why the government’s goal of ensuring compliance 
and deterring the fabrication of records would not be served 
by warrants issued on short notice as part of a regular, 
administrative enforcement scheme. 
 
For these reasons, I cannot accept the District Court’s 
loose interpretation of the administrative-search exception’s 
“necessity” requirement or believe that the warrant 
requirement can so easily be brushed aside.  Requiring the 
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government to establish probable cause for a search, whether 
based on suspected violations or as part of an overall 
administrative inspection plan, is no more than the Fourth 
Amendment requires.  Doing away with warrants in this 
instance creates a slippery slope whereby the government is 
permitted to test compliance with a law without the need for 
probable cause:  if the simple goal of ensuring compliance 
with recordkeeping requirements and deterring fabrication of 
those records is enough to justify warrantless inspections of 
businesses and homes in this case, I see no legal barrier to 
also permitting federal authorities to enter businesses and 
homes without a warrant to inspect tax records and supporting 
documentation.  As the absurdity of this example illustrates, 
the government’s justification for the administrative-search 
exception does not meet the criteria for the narrow exception 
the Supreme Court, and we, have carved out in our 
jurisprudence. 
 
As noted above, I concur in the judgment because I 
agree that the District Court should consider in the first 
instance how Jones impacts plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment 
claims.  But I would conclude as a matter of law that the 
administrative-search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement does not justify the warrantless 
inspections authorized under sections 2257 and 2257A. 
